In the years following the UK’s decision to leave the European Union, much of the economic discussion has centred on trade and overall economic performance. By contrast, the effect on immigration—especially the structure of the workforce—has received comparatively less systematic attention.

Recent analysis attempts to address this gap by modelling how the UK’s foreign-born workforce might have evolved had the country remained within the EU (Spinford & Portes, 2026). The findings suggest a nuanced outcome: while total numbers of foreign-born workers have not changed dramatically, the composition of that workforce has shifted significantly.

Prior to and immediately after the 2016 referendum, prevailing expectations were that Brexit would lead to a reduction in overall migration. Ending free movement was widely assumed to decrease inflows from EU countries, with only partial compensation through a more open system for non-EU nationals. Official projections at the time estimated a notable decline in work-related migration.

However, developments since then have been more complex. Following the introduction of the new immigration system in 2021, net migration increased sharply, reaching historically high levels by 2023. This rise prompted subsequent policy tightening, and alongside changes in labour market conditions, contributed to a marked decline in Skilled Worker visa issuance in the following years.

Importantly, these trends cannot be attributed solely to Brexit. External factors—including the COVID-19 pandemic, post-pandemic labour shortages, geopolitical events such as the war in Ukraine, and specific visa pathways like that for Hong Kong British Nationals (Overseas), have all played a role in shaping UK's migration patterns.

To better isolate the impact of Brexit, researchers constructed a “counterfactual” scenario by comparing the UK with a composite of similar European economies. This approach allows for a more robust assessment than relying on a single comparator or simply projecting pre-existing trends forward.

The results indicate a clear divergence in outcomes between EU and non-EU workers. Employment of EU-origin workers in the UK has stagnated relative to what might have been expected without Brexit. By contrast, employment of non-EU workers has expanded substantially under the post-2021 system, exceeding comparable trends in other European countries.

Taken together, these opposing movements largely offset each other in terms of overall numbers. As a result, the total population of foreign-born workers in the UK appears only moderately higher than it would have been in a non-Brexit scenario. The more significant change lies in where those workers come from.

More recent data suggests that the rapid growth in non-EU migration may be stabilising, reflecting tighter policy settings and easing labour shortages. This indicates that the post-Brexit migration landscape continues to evolve.

Ultimately, the evidence points to a structural shift rather than a simple increase or decrease in migration. While the UK has regained greater control over its immigration system, underlying pressures—such as demographic change and labour demand—remain largely unchanged.